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THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF MACROECONOMICS
IN PATENT ANTITRUST LAW: A COMMENT
ON MILLSTEIN
Richard A. Posner*
I shall depart from the standard format slightly, and comment
briefly on Professor Scherer's comment, as well as on the main paper.
I find myself in substantial agreement with both Mr. Millstein and
Professor Scherer. This may seem to involve a logical contradiction,
given the caustic tone of Scherer's comment. But I reconcile them as
follows. Professor Scherer has delivered a searing criticism not of the
paper that Mr. Millstein wrote, but of a paper he might have written.
This hypothetical paper would argue for a dramatic expansion in pat-
ent protection (a longer term, a lesser required showing of novelty,
utility, and nonobviousness, etc.) in order to increase America's lag-
ging productivity. Such a paper would be vulnerable to Professor
Scherer's criticisms, because, as he points out (and as I shall also
note), strengthening patent protection is not the unequivocal Good
Thing that Mr. Millstein seems to think it is.
The paper Millstein in fact wrote, however, is not a call for
greatly strengthened patent laws but a competent review and evalua-
tion of the major rules of antitrust law affecting the exploitation of
patents; I use "antitrust" broadly to include those aspects of the com-
mon law doctrine of patent misuse that are designed to prevent com-
petitive abuses by patent holders. I agree with Millstein that these
rules are becoming more liberal in the sense of more permissive and
that this trend is a good thing and should be encouraged. The rules
he criticizes are futile, costly vestiges of a period of unreasoning hos-
tility to, based on misunderstanding of, patent "monopolies."
I have only two comments of any significance. The first is that I
would like to see Mr. Millstein give more credit for the trend toward
more permissive antitrust policy to the Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis that began with Aaron Director in the 1950's, and that num-
bers among its members and alumni such important legal and eco-
nomic analysts as George Stigler, Robert Bork, Ward Bowman,
Lester Telser, Ronald Coase, John Peterman, John McGee, and
Frank Easterbrook-to name only a handful. It is difficult to estab-
* Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of
Chicago Law School. This is a slightly revised version of remarks delivered on May 16, 1987,
at a symposium on antitrust sponsored by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
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lish any causal relationship between the ideas of scholars and the deci-
sions of courts, but it seems more than an accident that both judicial
and academic antitrust thinking today closely resemble the approach
of the Chicago School as first adumbrated in the 1950's by Director. I
know that Mr. Millstein's own thinking about antitrust has changed
and I daresay that whether he knows it or not the change is due in
part to the vigorous advocacy and scholarship of the Chicago School.
My second comment, and only serious disagreement with Mr.
Millstein's paper, is that I think it is a mistake to try to connect issues
in patent antitrust law to our trade deficit or related macroeconomic
issues such as economic growth and international competition. The
history of efforts to impart macroeconomic significance to antitrust
issues is not a happy one. In the early days of the New Deal many
people thought that excessive competition was a cause of the Depres-
sion (or of its severity); and the result was the NRA Codes,' which
fostered cartelization. Later the pendulum of opinion swung the
other way and it was decided that too little rather than too much
competition had been a factor in the Depression. Both views are
fallacious.
The relationship between patent antitrust law on the one hand
and the trade deficit and other macroeconomic problems on the other
is extraordinarily complex, yet probably too insignificant to warrant
much effort at understanding. No doubt, if there were no patent pro-
tection at all the level of research and development expenditures
would be lower; and the funds diverted to other uses might well have
a lower social product, resulting in an efficiency loss, possibly a big
one. But the issues canvassed in Mr. Millstein's paper do not include
whether there should be patents. They are issues which, depending
on how they are resolved, will slightly raise or slightly lower the in-
come of patent holders. Consider, for example, tying. If patentees are
allowed to tie unpatented products to their patented products, there
are only two plausible consequences, now that the "leverage" theory
of tie-ins has been discredited. The first is that price discrimination
will be facilitated where (as in the tying of ink to mimeograph ma-
chines in the old Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.2 case) purchases of the tied
product vary with the intensity of the consumer's preference for the
tying product. The second possibility is that the goodwill of the pat-
entee will be enhanced in those cases where a malfunction in the tied
product is difficult to ascertain, so that the consumer may blame the
I See National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 3, 48 Stat. 195, 196-97 (1933) (held
unconstitutional in A. L. A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
2 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
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malfunction on the producer of the tying product.3 In both types of
case, allowing tying will increase the income of the patentee, but the
increase will probably be too small to make a significant difference in
the incentive to invent patentable products, especially since there is no
prohibition against patent price discrimination as such. Even in the
aggregate, it seems unlikely that recent and foreseeable changes in the
direction of more relaxed rules of patent antitrust law will signifi-
cantly increase the returns to invention.
And if they did, one could not pronounce that a good thing with-
out careful examination of the social returns to invention.4 Suppose
the term of a patent were increased from seventeen years to fifty years.
The result would be to increase the expected private returns from pat-
ents (though, because of discounting to present value, the increase
would not be nearly so dramatic as a comparison between seventeen
and fifty years might suggest). However, this might suck too many
resources into invention compared to activities which allow smaller or
no monopoly profits. Remember that the patent goes to the first in-
ventor, even if he beats his competitor by only one day. The greater
the private returns from invention, the greater the resources that will
be devoted to making the invention just a bit sooner than rivals, and
the costs may exceed the social benefits. To take an extreme example,
suppose that the net private and social benefit of some invention is
$1,000,000, discounted to present value. If Inventor X takes one year
to bring the invention to the stage where it is patentable, it will cost
him $500,000. To shorten this by a week will cost him another
$100,000. Although a saving of one week in bringing the invention to
this stage will have some social value, the increment in social value is
unlikely (given that the present value of the whole stream of future
benefits from the patent is only $1,000,000) to be as great as $100,000.
Nevertheless the investment may be worthwhile from a private stand-
point because it will enable X to enjoy the earnings from the patent
(now $400,000), rather than rival Y who cannot shave off a week.
Every policy change that goes to increase the expected gains from
patent development also generates incentives to make expenditures on
invention that may not be commensurate with the social gain from
the expenditures.
So, strengthening patent protection may not, on balance, be a
good thing; and if it is a good thing (as it may well be), changes in the
details of antitrust law are not going to have a big enough impact to
3 IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139 (1936).
4 See R&D, Patents, and Productivity (Z. Griliches ed. 1984).
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be worth worrying about from the standpoint of increasing the
amount of inventive activity.
I agree with Mr. Millstein's proposals, and don't want to pour
cold water on them. I merely want to "decouple" them from his ru-
minations on the economic crisis that he and others believe this nation
faces. It should be enough to justify his proposals that the rules he
criticizes cost something to administer, yet do no good and probably
do harm. Take the rule against patent tie-ins again. To the extent
that such tie-ins are a method of price discrimination, since other
methods of patent price discrimination are lawful what is the point of
singling out this one for prohibition? To the extent that such tie-ins
protect goodwill-and this is often the case with patent tie-ins, be-
cause a patented product is apt to be new or complex and in either
event to present problems of "fit" with complementary products, war-
ranting the manufacturer of the patented product in insisting on pro-
viding the complements as well-the rule raises the cost of invention.
So the tie-in rule is inefficient and should be abolished, but not be-
cause this or the other changes that Mr. Millstein discusses, singly or
together, will make an appreciable difference in the balance of trade
or the rate of economic growth.
I think it is not only irrelevant from a practical standpoint to
dwell on the macroeconomic dimension of patent antitrust law-so
trivial do I think that dimension-but counterproductive, in deflect-
ing attention from the nation's real economic ills. There was a period
during the 1970's when it looked as if antitrust might do real harm to
the American economy; consider, in particular, the groundless suits
against Kodak,5 IBM,6 and other highly efficient companies. But
with the decline in litigation in this decade,7 the danger has receded
and I do not think antitrust is any longer a major stumbling block to
corporate efficiency. If it is, it is dwarfed by such other economic and
political (including legal) phenomena as: (1) excessive regulation of
employment, by laws against racial and sexual discrimination, by col-
lective bargaining contracts (fostered by federal labor law), by the
minimum wage, OSHA,8 and by common law inroads into employ-
5 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
6 Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp. (In re IBM Periph-
eral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation), 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 698 F.2d
1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983).
7 See Kauper & Snyder, An Inquiry into the Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement:
Follow-On and Independently Initiated Cases Compared, 74 Geo. L.J. 1163, 1178, n.49, 1181
Table 3 (1986).
8 Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
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ment at will; (2) by other forms of costly, inefficient regulation (e.g.,
the Clean Air Act9 ); (3) the domination of government regulation,
government procurement, and other governmental activities by redis-
tributive rather than efficiency considerations; (4) heavy taxes, which
distort incentives and drain off resources into unproductive or inef-
ficiently managed activities; (5) poor quality of government at all
levels (including the judicial), which has as its only saving grace that
bad policies are often poorly executed and their thrust thereby
blunted; (6) low levels of investment; (7) poor work attitudes, lack of
discipline, and other symptoms of social disorganization including
broken families, high crime rates, and the prevalence of a self-indul-
gent style of living; and (8) a poor education system. In a list of im-
pediments to the nation's economic growth, antitrust policy, partly as
a result of reforms of recent years, ranks pretty low.
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
HeinOnline  -- 9 Cardozo L. Rev.  1207 1987-1988
HeinOnline  -- 9 Cardozo L. Rev.  1208 1987-1988
